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Capitini (1899-1968), Italian philosopher and 
pedagogist, was born in Perugia to a working-
class family and was admitted to the elite 
Scuola Normale at Pisa after preparing the 
Gymnasium final examination as a self-taught 
pupil. He had a job as the secretary of the 
Scuola Normale until he was fired in 1933 
because of his refusal to adhere to the Fascist 
Party. Together with Guido Calogero he 
founded in the Thirties the Liberal-Socialist 
underground movement. After 1945 he  
became a lecturer of moral philosophy at Pisa 
and in 1956 a Professor of Pedagogy at 
Cagliari and from 1965 at Perugia. Unlike 
other Liberal-Socialists he did not join the 
Partito d’Azione, the left-democratic party  
 
founded in 1942 nor, after its dissolution in 1947, the Partito Socialista. He founded the  
Movimento nonviolento, and the journal Azione nonviolenta, and started in 1961 the yearly march 
for peace from Perugia to Assisi. He died in 1968. 
Capitini’s main targets were, first, Giovanni Gentile, the Hegelian official thinker of the Fascist 
regime, secondly, and in a milder way, Benedetto Croce, whose ‘religion of freedom’ was then the 
Credo of liberal anti-Fascists, and thirdly, Giuseppe Mazzini, the father of Italian republicanism, 
because of his ‘idolatry’ of the nation-state. His sources were first, Kant, secondly, Marx, and 
besides Antonio Labriola as well as the tradition of ethical socialism, thirdly Gandhi, some of 
whose writings had been published in Italian in the Thirties, ironically on Gentile’s initiative, and in 
addition to these a number of existentialist, spiritualist, or neo-Kantian thinkers such as the poet 
Giacomo Leopardi, Carlo Michaelstaedter, Martin Buber, Henry Bergson, and Piero Martinetti, 
 
Elements of a Religious Experience (1937) resulted from a collection of lectures delivered by 
Capitini to clandestine meetings of young anti-Fascists. The book’s main idea is a critique of 
historicism in the name of typical Existentialist ideas such as the finitude and plurality of human 
beings, best expressed by their mortality.  
 
In Open Religion (1955), Capitini makes it clear that he is most unhappy with Croce’s solution to 
the problem of evil. Historicism has nothing to offer to the individual, unless he be satisfied with 
the idea that evil suffered by himself will be redeemed by others’ happiness in the course of future 
history. This is why Capitini’s attitude is “post-humanism instead of humanism” as far as it does not 
proclaim human action to be self-contained, but admits instead of an “opening” to “something 
other, something going beyond what is given here and now” (Ibidem, p. 185). Post-humanism 
shares the modern refusal of myths and dogmas by which religion used to promise a consolation for 
evil, and yet it is not content with the cavalier way in which modern secular thinking tries to look 
past the experience of evil. His difference from Croce lays in a vindication of a religious attitude, 
which points at a “liberated condition” where not only injustice but also evil and death be abolished. 
This is “open religion”. Croce’s historicism is dogmatic in its denial of religion as far as it pretends 
to give an answer on something beyond the boundaries of experience.  
 
“Opening”, derived from Bergson’s idea of ‘open’ morality and religion, is the key to his attack to 
historicism. The reason why war and violence are left as unavoidable traits of human existence by 
both conservative and revolutionary historicism is that historicism leaves the individual to take care 
of himself. The original mistake is conceiving of the individual as the “I”, not the “thou” as a 
starting-point. Starting with the “thou” implies positing brotherhood among individuals as a 
starting-point, and hope of overcoming the boundary of the individual’s death is a practical 
requirement, not a theoretical assertion; it amounts to keeping the “thou”, even after the 
individual’s death, as still belonging to a virtual community, named “co-presence”, to which all of 
us belong. The “thou-everybody” instead of the “Whole” cherished by historicists provides the 
horizon of such “co-presence”; in other words: “there is no Whole [tutto], instead there are all of us 
[tutti]” (Ibidem, p. 141).  
 
Co-presence is the fundamental assumption of “post-humanism”. In fact, “opening” is “living in a 
relationship to “the other”, and it is in itself practical, as far as “co-presence cannot be the subject-
matter of scientific knowledge, on the same footing as the world of matters-of-fact, but can only be 
experienced through commitments one may take, trough the ‘thou-all’ by means of which one 
addresses it” (Co-presence of the Living and the Dead, p. 11). It is also the key-attitude of “open 
religion”, a practical – as opposed to theoretical – attitude, which, while being different from that of 
modern historicism, is also different from the one of traditional religions in so far as it focuses on 
this shared secular world instead than in a separated world of the holy.  
 
The idea of “addition” is the third key-idea of post-humanism. The practical postulate of co-
presence justifies a refusal of dialectics as a framework for understanding the world and take 
addition as the alternative to negation, the basic category of dialectics. That is, co-presence is 
something more than, or something added to nature and life in a biological sense, something similar 
to Kant’s kingdom of ends. In this vein birth, not death, like Arendt and unlike Heidegger is the 
focus of existence, and each individual’s birth is an “addition” to the reality of co-presence, from 
which he shall be never excluded, and that is an enrichment for all. This is meant to provide an 
alternative to historicist immanentism, which substitutes the Whole to individuals, and according to 
which all individuals “disappear, bequeathing the Whole their own deeds. On the opposite, 
according to the alternative view, based on the idea of opening to co-presence, all individuals go on 
existing and co-operating forever” (Ibidem, p. 96). 
 
The critique of Realpolitk and the vindication of non-violence as a new kind of political realism are 
the main practical implications of Capitini’s critique of historicism. In Elements of a Religious 
Experience (1937) he started elaborating on the ideas of Gandhi, and puts forth the idea of a “non-
violent revolution” as a permanent effort of bringing into reality “omnicracy”, that is, the power of 
all, understood as the radical alternative to state-authoritarianism and nationalism. Pacifism is 
another practical implications; the argument in favour is that historicism, both of the right-wing 
nationalist and of the left-wing revolutionary kind, falls into the logical fallacy of deriving what 
ought to be from matters of fact, from a mistaken view of freedom that accepts the results of others’ 
choices as a compulsory starting-point for my action, from the assumption that the final state of 
affairs is the only criterion for judging the right course of action, while instead the criterion of the 
right action is in both the goodness of the final state and the goodness of those actions out of which 
the final state results. 
 
Non-violence, in Capitini’s writings from the Fifties and Sixties, is also the basis for a third way 
between ‘revolution’, understood as military insurgence, and reformism, understood as top-down 
social engineering without direct action by citizens; he writes that Western Communists have given 
up the idea of a violent destruction of Western Capitalism and this may be not too bad, but “a 
struggle for liberation is still required, and one should skip the danger of coming to terms with the 
existing structures of society […] In order to liberate civil society from the centralising and 
militaristic Empire-State, in order not to accept the gifts of Neo-Capitalism that does not change 
anything radically, we need to add to already-existing means, other more direct collective, non-
violent and down-top means of keeping power under control and granting a public presence to all”  
(Open education, vol. 2, p. 294). 
 
In Italy Capitini has been ignored by the old as well as by the new left. Tiny minority groups have 
taken notice of his legacy, that is, non-violent, pacifists, conscientious objectors. Among thinkers 
who realized the importance of his thought are pedagogists Aldo Visalberghi and Lamberto Borghi 
and philosophers Norberto Bobbio and Giuliano Pontara. The tide changed in the eighties, when the 
Perugia-Assisi march became fashionable and politicians started showing up there in order to be 
interviewed by the media. A few monographs on Capitini have been published in Italian but still 
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